Again on Stealth Taxes: New VAT inefficient in reducing the deficit
Once again, the idea of introducing a Value-Added Tax (VAT, better termed the “Stealth Tax”) to curb our mushrooming deficits is being discussed. This time, in a Feb. 4, 2010 article in Time magazine, Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs suggests the use of a new tax in America, the VAT, stating “Both sides could agree, for example, on a value-added tax (VAT) – a sort of national sales tax – combined with closing loopholes and reducing some marginal tax rates, including the corporate tax rate….”
Suggesting that we use a VAT instead of a straight-up sales tax to finance anything in this country, even a reduction in the corporate income tax, signifies either a lack of understanding of basic public finance or a willingness for the federal government to increase taxes on American buyers in ways unperceived by most voters. While a VAT would be more visible than running deficits, which is another form of unperceived taxation, a regular sales tax would be far more visible by tax payers and works better in other respects, as well.
Sachs is right that a national VAT is sort of a national sales tax. With the VAT, instead of charging a flat rate on every dollar of retail sales, that same rate is collected from producers on the difference between the cost of the goods that they sell and their sales revenues, that is, on the value that they add to goods at each stage of production, from raw materials producer to manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer. Take the case of a loaf of bread that sells for a dollar. In the process of making the bread, a wheat farmer sells wheat to a mill which sells flour to a bakery which sells bread to a store which sells it to the final customer. The wheat that went into the flour that went into a loaf of bread sold for a quarter, while that much flour sold for a half dollar while the baker sold the bread to the retailer for 75 cents. Each producer adds a quarter at each of the four stages of production. If each producer is charged a 10 percent VAT, each of the four pays a tax of 2 1/2 cents, which adds 10 cents to the cost of the bread. The price of the bread ends up going up by 10 cents, the same amount as it would if there were just a national sales tax of 10 percent. Who ends up paying for this tax? It is the same person who ends up paying the sales tax, mostly the consumer.
This does not mean that there is no difference between these sales taxes and the VAT. Since most areas of the country already have some sort of sales tax, a national sales tax would cost little extra to collect. With a VAT, we would have to add a huge bureaucracy of accountants to check the cost of goods sold and the sales at each stage of production. This is a very costly tax to collect. With a sales tax, however, we could, in most states, piggyback collection and enforcement efforts on state and local government efforts.
Another difference is that the burden of a sales tax on the poor can be eased by putting exemptions on certain classes of goods, such as groceries, utilities or medicine, because the poor spend a larger portion of their income on these items than wealthier citizens. With a VAT, producer groups can be excluded, not consumer groups. Instead of easing the burden on certain consumers by exempting certain items such as groceries and medications from the sales tax, the VAT can only exempt certain producers. This not only makes it difficult for the tax to be eased on the poor, but also makes it more likely that many producer groups will be lobbying in Washington to get their group excluded from the tax. Special interests do not lobby as much for exemptions from sales taxes because it is harder for consumer groups to organize than it is for producer groups. For Sachs, who rightly complains of the influence of special interests in Washington, to give special interests a greater incentive to lobby in Washington means that he does not understand the political incentives posed by certain forms of taxation.
A national VAT differs from a national sales tax in another important way. With a sales tax we see what we pay in these taxes at the cash register. The consumer never sees the bill for a Value-Added Tax, though the consumer ends up paying for the tax since it is mostly passed forward to the buyer. The lack of visibility of the VAT has prompted some critics of this tax, including me, to call it the Stealth Tax, because it hits the taxpayer/voter before she ever sees it coming. If there is a tax increase to pay for some new spending program, the tax increase is passed on as a price increase, and the buyer tends to blame the seller instead of the government. But when the taxpayer/voter sees the bill for big government, she starts to question whether the spending is necessary. But when we don’t perceive the costs, we seldom question the value of the spending program.
The problem of the lack of visibility of a tax was first pointed out in 1903 by the Italian economist, Amilcare Puviani (as we see in this Richard Wagner paper), and then popularized among English-speaking economists by one of my professors, Jim Buchanan, a problem that has been called “fiscal illusion.” As voters, we are more likely to ask for new spending programs if we never notice how much it costs. Importantly, Buchanan and others have noted that tax cuts and deficits fail to “starve the spending beast” of government, as many conservatives have proposed to deal with government spending, and instead reduce the visibility of the cost of spending to voters. Voters, then, become more supportive of almost every new spending program that comes along. If the problem we are tackling with the VAT is the deficit, a very visible national sales tax makes a better weapon against the deficit than the stealthy VAT.
Sachs is quick to remind us that the VAT is widely used in Europe. This is true. And the Europeans have tackled the regressivity of the VAT buy introducing many spending programs to help the poor. If we are facing a deficit problem, it would seem that additional programs to help alleviate tax regressivity unnecessarily add to the deficit by increasing spending on uncontrollable entitlements.
We should also note that the Europeans arrived at their VAT by their own peculiar history. Their VAT evolved from their former business tax, a tax on gross receipts at each stage of production. In our bread example, a 10 percent tax would collect 2 1/2 cents from the farmer, a little more than a nickel from the miller, about 8 cents from the baker and about eleven cents from the retailer, adding up to more than 21 cents. The Europeans quickly found that businesses could avoid the tax by combining the various stages of production into one business which would lower their taxes considerably, giving vertically integrated firms an advantage over those there are not. It should also be pointed out that the Europeans already had a system in place to tax at each stage of business sales rather than a retail sales tax bureaurocracy.
So, if we are to go down the road of a new national tax on spending, we should note that a true national sales tax is superior to a VAT at every step, from being more visible and more of a deterrent to federal spending sprees, to being better suited to being shaped to help protect the poor from tax regressivity, to being less prone to being shaped to the liking of special interests, to being cheaper to administer.
-MC
(Note: I have written more than once about the Value-added tax, or VAT, and have repeated some of my own words from past articles, especially see “Vat for financing health care proposals still a bad idea.”)