Bastiat's Bastions

Lafayette’s Daily Advertiser reports here  that there is a group pushing for higher gas taxes in Louisiana for road building and repairs.  OK, fair enough, taxes on gasoline in Louisiana and in most states go to a road building fund of some sort, and so, people who pay these taxes, users of roads, pay for their use based on their use, or at least on the gas they buy.  And of course, the more people use the roads, the more gas they buy.

So, a gasoline tax is just about an ideal benefit tax.  There are two somewhat conflicting standards of fair taxation, and the benefit principle of tax fairness is one that involves a real exchange.  If a person uses our roads, they pay for gas here and so, pay for the use of the roads.  In other words, the benefit principle suggests that a person should get what they pay for, or at least pay for what they get.  That sounds fair to me.  Just like someone who drinks coffee that they got at a cafe pay for what they get. 

So, this organization, Driving Louisiana Forward, wants better repaired roads.  I understand that—me, too.  But a more careful reading of the article reveals something important.  The group is not an organization of drivers, but a coalition of road construction companies and road engineering companies.  These are folks who want the rest of us to hire them.  These are folks who want the drivers of this state to pay more into the road fund to keep them well paid. 

At least the legislators interviewed for the story gave the tax hike proposed a zero chance of passing.  This is definitely a group and an issue to keep an eye on.

–MC

Years ago, I read Tom Godwin’s science fiction short story, “The Cold Equations.”  Wikipedia has a pretty accurate summary of the story here.  Sometimes in life we have to make decisions not to help someone, because by doing so, others will react in ways that bring harm to themselves and others. 

A fire department in Tennessee let a house burn to the ground and did nothing to put it out, but then put out a fire that spread to the neighbor’s house (read the story here).  Whoa.  Harsh.  But perhaps, the result of those cold equations.

Notice that the fire was in a rural part of a county, outside of the town fire department’s jurisdiction.  The fire department for years had offered to provide fire protection to homeowners in areas outside of their city limits, provided the homeowner had paid a $75 annual fee–sort of a form of fire insurance.

If they accepted the $75 fee when a fire was burning, no one in those rural areas would ever pay again for fire-fighting services.  Then, the fire department would not have the resources to fight fires outside of the city limits.  No one in the rural parts of the county would have fire protection after that.  This is a problem economists call the “free-rider problem,” where people expect to be able to let others pay for their goods or services.  The suppliers are not able to collect enough to be able to provide the service at all, and so they do not, even though it is worth what the sellers are asking for the service.  The result is that no one gets the service.

And while I do not like the Obama Health Care program, forcing people to pay ahead of time making them buy health insurance is just a reaction to a free-rider problem we have in health care, especially since emergency rooms in hospitals are not allowed to do what the fire department did, they must treat the patient.

So, while the decision of the fire department seems harsh, if they were to have gone ahead and put out that fire, they would soon have been unable to provide such services to their rural neighbors at all.

–MC

In my previous post, I discussed why the political design of the stimulus package was doomed to inefficiency in producing jobs, because it was designed to help the re-election efforts of politicians by bringing home the bacon instead of being designed to reduce unemployment. There is, of course, another way in which the stimulus spending has proved wasteful besides not generating the jobs that were hope for.

The real reason people want jobs is so that they can pay for the things they want.  If people are busy making things that no one wants, they cannot produce the things we want.  Instead of directing resources to making things people, the stimulus package that Congress came up with in record time (before anyone could tell what they were doing) directed resources into creating many things that most people care little about, such as bullet trains from LA to Las Vegas, bridges to nowhere, or road and sidewalk resurfacing projects for roads and sidewalks recently resurfaced.

What happens when we just throw money at projects no one seems to care about is that we inject money into the economic system, but we really do not get any real valued goods as a result.  More money without more goods that are valued means the prices of things we desire just start getting bid up—inflation.

We might as well put people back to work by having some dig holes for others to refill.  When resources go to make things not very high on our priorities, Keynesian styled stimulus or not, the spending is still wasted.  And waste is never productive.

If workers truly had no options for work available to them, then the use of public funds to make something really valued by the public, would be produced at a very low opportunity cost.  But, making something of little value to the public, only of value to the public official squanders the opportunity to turn low-valued resources into something of higher value.

The same Keynesian stimulus could take place if the resources were guided by the demands of the members of the public, instead of wasted by their elected representatives.  A point similar to this was made by Frederic Bastiat with his parable of the broken window in his essay, “What is seen and what is not seen.”

–MC

Vice President Joe Biden has recently been touting the amazing performance of stimulus package in bringing us back from the brink of economic disaster (CBS News). In speaking at The Brookings Institution, Biden said “But the fact that the recovery act is multifaceted doesn’t reflect a lack of design, it is the design.” The spending and tax relief stimulus package that the White House left up to Congress to design, what we got was something that resembled a platypus, that is often said to be designed by a committee.

In a working paper (just written, and not yet published; cited here with permission of the authors) Andrew Young and Russell Sobel of the University of West Virginia explain why concentrating more of the stimulus spending in areas where it would have a bigger effect on unemployment, such as areas with high unemployment rates and where incomes are low (which would be areas where people re-spend more of each dollar of income, creating a larger ripple effect in their area). These researchers found that these economic factors associated with more efficient stimulus spending, were either unrelated to the location of the stimulus spending or the statistical relationship was of the “wrong sign.” This means that in the cases where the researchers could detect a relationship between these local economic factors and the location of stimulus spending, the spending was in the places where it would have a lower effect on economic activity, rather than where it would have a greater impact.

A good example of the inefficiency of stimulus spending is found in Los Angeles. The International Business Times and the LA Times note that the stimulus spending has been particularly disappointing in that city, where $111 million the city received in stimulus money created or saved fewer than 55 jobs, amounting to more than $2 million per job created or saved. If the nearly $800 billion stimulus program were to have an average efficiency in creating jobs equal to LA’s, that would mean a grand total of 400,000 jobs created or saved, 2% of our nation’s 19.4 million unemployed. Obviously, a more efficient way to help people would have been to give money directly to people. Isn’t that what tax cuts are about?

Instead of having a single designer with a single major objective, the stimulus package was designed by politicians with their own objectives, objectives to reduce unemployment—their own unemployment. Young and Sobel find that political factors were much important in determining where stimulus money got spent than the economic factors. This is like Congress voting to spend $1 billion on helping victims of a fire disaster in Colorado and finding that most of that money was spent in Oklahoma.

What should be unsurprising is that Young and Sobel found that the best predictor of where the stimulus grant spending occurred was the past geographical pattern of government grants. The same political power that determined previous grant spending, such as homeland security grants, persisted and affected stimulus spending in the same fashion.

Young and Sobel’s results reflect what Bob Tollison and Gokhan Karahan found in our 2006 Public Choice paper on Homeland Security spending—that Congress does not spend money in the areas to meet the problem it is supposed to be addressing, but rather, money is spent in a way to gain approval, and payoffs are made to certain politician’s districts or states to gain politicians’ approvals, just like we saw last year with the healthcare bill.

So, the political design of the stimulus bill, spending on pork-barrel projects favored by key politicians to help guarantee their re-election efforts, with money being thrown at their districts, the way a Mardi Gras crew throws things along a parade route, does little to get people into meaningful work. Rather, the public purse is once again used for the re-election efforts of the powerful politicians.

-MC

What got my attention this week was something I heard this past Sunday on Fareed Zakaria’s Global Public Square (GPS) program on CNN.  Zakaria states point blank, that the Bush tax cuts are the single largest part of the deficit.

Notice that Mr. Zakaria thinks he has Greenspan and Paulson in a “gotcha moment,” claiming that they fail to live up to the ”courage of their convictions”  by not supporting immediate repeal of the Bush Tax Cuts.  The problem is that Zakaria is a poor listener.  We face two problems, the recession, which is short term and acute, and the deficit which is long term and chronic.  Notice that Paulson says that the deficit is a long-term problem.  Zakaria is missing a vital point in this discussion.  Reducing deficits, either by raising taxes or cutting spending, during downturns are widely thought to exacerbate recessions.  Paulson and Greenspan both suggest that now, because of our current recession, is not the time to be raising taxes, but they never rule out raising them at some time in the future.

Zakaria later points listeners to a Feb. 4, 2010 article in Time by Jeffrey Sachs, a leading economist at Columbia University, whose work on something called the “natural resource curse” has captured my recent research attention.

The current budget deficit runs about 10% of our national GDP (US  tax receipts are currently at 15% of GDP while spending is at 25%).  Sachs writes in his article that closing up the Bush tax cuts on the rich would only amount to .4% of GDP, which means that the Bush tax cuts account for only 4% of the deficit.  Sachs states: “even with rollbacks of tax cuts for the rich, the fiscal gap will remain enormous.  The Bush cuts in rates hardly account for the biggest part of the current deficit, as Zakaria claims.  Zakaria is not only a poor listener, he is also a poor reader.

Take a look at this picture of Federal Spending and Receipts in millions of dollars:

Here are those same figures but as percentages of GDP:

I should point out that there were actually two Bush Tax Cuts, one enacted in  2001 after 9/11 and the other in 2003.

Note that tax revenues rose faster after the 2nd Bush tax cuts than they did in the Clinton era, with the tax revenue growth coming to an end in 2007 at the beginning of the recession.

More importantly, notice that starting in 2001, public spending as a percent of GDP started to grow again after shrinking, as it had over the Clinton era.  While we should avoid post hoc thinking, we should also note that while the  tax cuts may have led to revenue declines, there were also large increases in government spending that started at the beginning of the Bush era.  The Bush spending programs included a generous pharmaceuticals program for the elderly, an increase in Homeland Security spending, an expensive war in Iraq in 2003 and allowing Republicans in Congress to spend heavily in their districts to increase their reelection chances.

It is the growth of entitlement spending that is at the heart of our future deficit problem, and in the very near future, growth in entitlement spending, from Social Security to Medicaid to Medicare, will be the drivers in our deficits.  Driving these spending figures are an aging population and rising health care prices.  One of the biggest reasons for the rising health care prices is that we have an aging population, boosting the demand for health care goods and services.  Increasing entitlements, through the health care bills that have gotten approval in the House and the Senate are destined to push projected deficits even higher.

A more realistic, as well as more pessimistic, view of the growing defict is reported in this ABC article.  The article reports the findings of the Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform.  One of the commission’s publications is the testimony of Alice Rivlin.  Rivlin, an economist who was appointed by Johnson, Carter and Clinton to various government posts, recently testified before the Senate Budget Committee.  In her testimony, she states “In the next decade and beyond, federal spending, driven by the impact of an aging population and rising health care costs on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, will rise substantially faster than the whole economy can grow–faster than the GDP.  Revenues, at any likely set of tax rates, will grow only slightly faster than the GDP.  The gap between spending and revenues will keep widening.” Obviously, repealing the Bush Tax Cuts, as Zakaria suggests, will do little if “revenues, at any likely set of tax rates,” will grow more slowly than the promised spending from Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.

Recently, my daughter and her roommate drove from Natchitoches, LA to Monroe, LA and followed her roommate’s global positioning device.   The car’s GPS routed them through Shreveport, doubling the usual time through Winnfield and Ruston.

As bad as the advice my daughter and her roommate got from the auto GPS, it did get her to her destination.  Zakaria’s suggestion that repealing the Bush tax cuts, or allowing them to expire, would put us much closer to erasing the deficit is just seriously misleading.   Zakaria’s GPS does not even set us on the right path.  Perhaps if Zakaria would listen more carefully and read the articles he suggests to his listeners, he might be worth listening to.

And this just in, President Obama has created a bi-partisan commission to come up with ways to deal with the deficit crisis.  From what I understand, the commission’s proposals would come before Congress to be voted on, yes or no, without amendments.  Unlike Zakaria’s suggestion of dealing with the Bush Tax Cuts (which should be on the commission’s table), President Obama has put us on course to effectively dealing with the long-term deficit problem, looking at both the spending and the revenue side of the deficit problem.

-MC

Once again, the idea of introducing a Value-Added Tax (VAT, better termed the “Stealth Tax”) to curb our mushrooming deficits is being discussed. This time, in a Feb. 4, 2010 article in Time magazine, Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs suggests the use of a new tax in America, the VAT, stating “Both sides could agree, for example, on a value-added tax (VAT) – a sort of national sales tax – combined with closing loopholes and reducing some marginal tax rates, including the corporate tax rate….”

Suggesting that we use a VAT instead of a straight-up sales tax to finance anything in this country, even a reduction in the corporate income tax, signifies either a lack of understanding of basic public finance or a willingness for the federal government to increase taxes on American buyers in ways unperceived by most voters.  While a VAT would be more visible than running deficits, which is another form of unperceived taxation, a regular sales tax would be far more visible by tax payers and works better in other respects, as well.

Sachs is right that a national VAT is sort of a national sales tax. With the VAT, instead of charging a flat rate on every dollar of retail sales, that same rate is collected from producers on the difference between the cost of the goods that they sell and their sales revenues, that is, on the value that they add to goods at each stage of production, from raw materials producer to manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer. Take the case of a loaf of bread that sells for a dollar. In the process of making the bread, a wheat farmer sells wheat to a mill which sells flour to a bakery which sells bread to a store which sells it to the final customer. The wheat that went into the flour that went into a loaf of bread sold for a quarter, while that much flour sold for a half dollar while the baker sold the bread to the retailer for 75 cents. Each producer adds a quarter at each of the four stages of production. If each producer is charged a 10 percent VAT, each of the four pays a tax of 2 1/2 cents, which adds 10 cents to the cost of the bread. The price of the bread ends up going up by 10 cents, the same amount as it would if there were just a national sales tax of 10 percent. Who ends up paying for this tax? It is the same person who ends up paying the sales tax, mostly the consumer.

This does not mean that there is no difference between these sales taxes and the VAT. Since most areas of the country already have some sort of sales tax, a national sales tax would cost little extra to collect. With a VAT, we would have to add a huge bureaucracy of accountants to check the cost of goods sold and the sales at each stage of production. This is a very costly tax to collect. With a sales tax, however, we could, in most states, piggyback collection and enforcement efforts on state and local government efforts.

Another difference is that the burden of a sales tax on the poor can be eased by putting exemptions on certain classes of goods, such as groceries, utilities or medicine, because the poor spend a larger portion of their income on these items than wealthier citizens. With a VAT, producer groups can be excluded, not consumer groups. Instead of easing the burden on certain consumers by exempting certain items such as groceries and medications from the sales tax, the VAT can only exempt certain producers.  This not only makes it difficult for the tax to be eased on the poor, but also makes it more likely that many producer groups will be lobbying in Washington to get their group excluded from the tax. Special interests do not lobby as much for exemptions from sales taxes because it is harder for consumer groups to organize than it is for producer groups. For Sachs, who rightly complains of the influence of special interests in Washington, to give special interests a greater incentive to lobby in Washington means that he does not understand the political incentives posed by certain forms of taxation.

A national VAT differs from a national sales tax in another important way. With a sales tax we see what we pay in these taxes at the cash register. The consumer never sees the bill for a Value-Added Tax, though the consumer ends up paying for the tax since it is mostly passed forward to the buyer. The lack of visibility of the VAT has prompted some critics of this tax, including me, to call it the Stealth Tax, because it hits the taxpayer/voter before she ever sees it coming. If there is a tax increase to pay for some new spending program, the tax increase is passed on as a price increase, and the buyer tends to blame the seller instead of the government.  But when the taxpayer/voter sees the bill for big government, she starts to question whether the spending is necessary. But when we don’t perceive the costs, we seldom question the value of the spending program.

The problem of the lack of visibility of a tax was first pointed out in 1903 by the Italian economist, Amilcare Puviani (as we see in this Richard Wagner paper), and then popularized among English-speaking economists by one of my professors, Jim Buchanan, a problem that has been called “fiscal illusion.” As voters, we are more likely to ask for new spending programs if we never notice how much it costs.   Importantly, Buchanan and others have noted that tax cuts and deficits fail to “starve the spending beast” of government, as many conservatives have proposed to deal with government spending, and instead reduce the visibility of the cost of spending to voters. Voters, then, become more supportive of almost every new spending program that comes along.  If the problem we are tackling with the VAT is the deficit, a very visible national sales tax makes a better weapon against the deficit than the stealthy VAT.

Sachs is quick to remind us that the VAT is widely used in Europe. This is true. And the Europeans have tackled the regressivity of the VAT buy introducing many spending programs to help the poor.  If we are facing a deficit problem, it would seem that additional programs to help alleviate tax regressivity unnecessarily add to the deficit by increasing spending on uncontrollable entitlements.

We should also note that the Europeans arrived at their VAT by their own peculiar history. Their VAT evolved from their former business tax, a tax on gross receipts at each stage of production. In our bread example, a 10 percent tax would collect 2 1/2 cents from the farmer, a little more than a nickel from the miller, about 8 cents from the baker and about eleven cents from the retailer, adding up to more than 21 cents. The Europeans quickly found that businesses could avoid the tax by combining the various stages of production into one business which would lower their taxes considerably, giving vertically integrated firms an advantage over those there are not.  It should also be pointed out that the Europeans already had a system in place to tax at each stage of business sales rather than a retail sales tax bureaurocracy.

So, if we are to go down the road of a new national tax on spending, we should note that a true national sales tax is superior to a VAT at every step, from being more visible and more of a deterrent to federal spending sprees, to being better suited to being shaped to help protect the poor from tax regressivity, to being less prone to being shaped to the liking of special interests, to being cheaper to administer.

-MC

(Note: I have written more than once about the Value-added tax, or VAT, and have repeated some of my own words from past articles, especially see “Vat for financing health care proposals still a bad idea.”)

The L.A. Times reports some of the problems with the new homeowner $8000 tax credit in this story.  Besides fresh ground for tax cheats to exploit, this tax credit may not be worth getting.

In my introductory economics class, we just finished looking at how taxes get passed forward to buyers in higher prices or back to the sellers in reduced prices received.  What we saw in class was that if the buyers faced few alternatives, while the sellers had many, most of the tax gets paid for by the buyer in the form of a higher price.  If the sellers have few alternatives, but the buyers have many, the sellers pay most of the tax in terms of a lower received price, while the buyers pay only a little more than the original price. 

Of course, if the government subsidizes buyers in a market instead of taxing them, the same thing happens, but in reverse.  Subsidies are only negative taxes, so a subsidy to buyers in a market just raises the amount the buyers are willing to pay to the sellers.  Consider the $8000 tax credit to home buyers.  This tax credit merely raises the amount buyers will pay to sellers.  And since the buyers have many alternatives while the sellers, often facing foreclosures, have few alternatives but to sell, have few alternatives but to sell, the price the buyers pay ends up rising almost by the amount of the tax credit.  Few new homes are being built in response to the tax credits.  So mostly, the tax credit for buyers boosts the prices received by those facing losing their homes in a foreclosure, where only the bank receives the money. 

So those considering buying a home before the December 1st deadline because of the tax credit should probably think twice.  Most of the tax credit will go to the sellers. 

But even if some of it goes to the buyers, shouldn’t it be worth the buyer’s effort?  The answer is maybe, but  maybe not.  One provision of the tax credit is that the buyer has to live in the home at least three years, or the buyer must repay half of the tax credit, or $4000.  If the buyer faces the possibility of losing her home, facing repayment of $4000, while having to pay $7000 more for a house and getting an $8000 tax credit may not be that good of a deal.   

-MC

Some months ago I was asked to find someone who could determine the feasibility of a device reinvented by a local fisherman.   The machine was an alternator driven by a bicycle that charged a car battery bicycle.  An electric motor hooked up to the battery turned the wheel of the bicycle.

The claim was that the device produced electricity.  Of course, it produced a charge, but used more energy than it produced—a perpetual motion machine.  Such machines have been invented and reinvented for hundreds of years.  And well-meaning garage inventors reinvent perpetual motion devices with every up-tick in energy prices.   But physics triumphs and we know that the law of conservation of energy and matter still rules.  Only part of the energy from the battery gets converted to work, with the rest being converted into friction and heat.  Energy is not created out of nothing.

In trying to reinvent the health care delivery system, Senator Baucus seems to have invented a perpetual financing device , but one that will only push up prices and inhibit real innovation.  What Senator Baucus wants to do is to tax the very providers of health devices, such as heart stents, artificial hips, and diagnostic machines in order to help pay for the new health care system that the federal government is reinventing.

There is a slight problem with all of this.  Taxes collected from businesses are only partly paid by the producers, with the rest of the tax paid by the buyers in the form of higher prices.  The easier sellers can move to something not taxed to sell, the more the tax gets passed along to buyers.  The more these taxed items are covered by insurance, by other people paying the bill, the more the tax gets passed along to the buyers.  If buyers have many non-taxed alternatives and find it easier to switch to them than the sellers can switch to non-taxed goods to sell, then less of the tax gets passed to buyers and the sellers will have to pay more of the tax.  Of course, if sellers find switching easier than buyers, the taxed gets passed on to the buyers.  In other words, the side of the market that can avoid the tax the easiest by switching what they have been doing will be the side that contributes less to paying the tax.

With medical devices, it is very likely that the sellers find it easier to go from making wheel chairs to making non-taxed items than wheel chair users can switch to some non-taxed item.  Still, to the extent that the tax is borne by sellers, it reduces profits in these industries and reduces innovation as well.

What looks like will happen with this financing plan is that the tax will be passed along to buyers including Medicaire and insurance, who will raise taxes and raise premiums to pay for the higher priced devices which will lead to higher prices for the medical devices, higher premiums and higher taxes.  Of course, after a while, the increasing out-of-pocket expenses reduce purchases along the way.

This financing scheme looks as if it were designed by the same guy who hooked up a car battery to an electric motor, a bicycle and an alternator.  The problem is that both of these end up coming to halt and are unsustainable schemes.  Genius at work?  Not!

-MC

Many on the conservative side have had many negative things to say about the “Cap and Trade” system.  It should be pointed out that “cap and trade” itself, is not  the source of their ire.  Rather, many conservatives do not like limitations being placed on CO₂ emissions in the US. 

What is this “Cap and Trade” system that is being implemented in the new climate change bill?  Cap and Trade is merely an approach to regulating emissions, and it is one that efficiently reduces those emissions.  It contrasts with two other approaches: one that is called the “command and control” approach to regulation and the other is an approach that taxes emissions, such as the proposed “carbon tax” to regulate greenhouse gases a decade ago.  Before looking look at these regulatory systems, let’s look at the ideal environmental regulatory outcome.

At first glance, it would seem that no pollution would be the best regulatory outcome.  Think of what this would mean when we consider CO₂ as a pollutant.  We inhale oxygen, but if CO₂ is a pollutant and we want no pollution, then, we better hold that breath.  But we cannot.  Stopping all pollution is just too costly. Anything we do to reduce our pollution will cost us something. But, of course, pollution itself is costly, either health costs, or aesthetic costs, or costs in losses of biodiversity. The ideal, then, is really to keep the total costs of pollution and the costs of reducing that pollution to a minimum. 

Generally, each extra ton of emissions of CO₂ causes the added costs of pollution to increase.  Also, if we look to reducing CO₂ emissions, we can find some inexpensive ways to cut emissions, and after we cut emissions in those ways, to cut emissions further, we would have to employ costlier and costlier means.  To keep these total costs to a minimum, the added costs from cutting a ton of CO₂ emissions have to equal the added costs of the damage done by another ton of CO₂ emissions.  If the added costs are higher from the damage done from another ton of CO₂ than from cutting emissions, we could lower total costs by cutting emissions.  On the other hand, if the added costs of cutting emissions by a ton are higher than from the damage done from another ton, total costs could be lowered if we go ahead and pollute that ton.  The “right amount” of pollution, then, is the amount where another ton would cause costs of cutting pollution by the same amount as the costs of the damage done by another ton of pollution.

Of the three methods of pollution control to understand, the easiest to understand is the “command and control” system.  Here, the regulatory commission sets requirements for each source of pollution, monitors them for compliance, and then sets fines and punishments for those who fail to comply with the regulatory requirements.  Here, possible polluters just do what they are told or face extremely high fines or other punishments.  The “command and control” name for this regulatory type comes from the management form used in the military.  Historically, most of regulation of the EPA has been of this “command and control” type.  The best way of thinking about this approach is to recall the lines from Tennyson’s “Charge of the Light Brigade:”

Theirs not to make reply

 Theirs not the reason why

    Theirs but to do or die.

 This command and control system of regulation does not do a very good job of keeping costs of regulation down, nor does it do a good job of balancing the costs of damage with the costs of reducing emissions.  The regulatory authority just does not have information on all of the costs.  This information is mostly diffused throughout the society—various electric power generating companies have a good idea of what their costs of cutting emissions are like, so a lot of people have bits and pieces of this information, and no one knows it all. 

One of the earliest regulatory suggestions for reducing the costs of pollution control was made by A.C. Pigou in 1920 in his book, The Economics of Welfare (with the word “welfare” meaning “wellbeing”).  Pigou suggested that a tax could be levied on certain activities, such as pollution, that would give people an incentive to reduce those activities.  Economists in the 1960s and 1970s saw that such a tax would get polluters to reduce pollution in a least-cost way.  Any producer who could reduce emissions at a cost below the tax would do so, while those who could only cut their emissions at a higher cost would not.  Suppose the tax on emissions is $100 per ton.  All pollution reduction that costs more than $100 per ton will not take place, but pollution reduction that costs less than $100 per ton will take place.  Lower cost cleanup activities replace higher cost cleanup and costs cannot get any lower.

A little later on, economists came up with a slightly different approach.  The environmental regulatory authority would first decide how much emissions would be allowed, create “pollution rights” which would be tradable.  Polluters who could reduce pollution very cheaply could then reduce their emissions and sell their rights to those who could only cut their emissions at a very high cost.  If the price of a pollution permit were higher than the cost of cutting emissions, the producer could then reduce their emissions and sell off their permit.  If the emission permit sold for a price below the cost of cutting pollution, the emitter would buy up permits.  If you think that such a scheme is unworkable, think again.  We have been using tradable permits of this sort to control SO₂ emissions that cause acid rain since the 1990s, and these permits trade on the Chicago Board of Exchange, along with various commodities.

The Pigou tax on pollution, which we saw a decade ago called a carbon tax, gives polluters a constant price to respond to, and the total amount of emissions could be higher or lower and can change over time.  If the costs of cleaning up go up, we end up with higher levels of emissions.  On the other hand, the tradable permits system produces a constant level of emissions but with a price of pollution that varies.  Both of these methods minimizes the costs of cutting pollution because both produces a price for cleaning up so that those with costs of cutting a ton of emissions above that price do not cut their pollution and those with costs of cutting a ton of emissions below that price do cut emissions.  Only the low-cost emission cutters reduce their pollution while high-cost emission cutters do not, and face either taxes or having to pay for pollution permits. 

For global pollutants, such as greenhouse gases, there could be international trade in CO₂ permits.  This is the general idea behind “cap and trade.”  For this to work well, however, there would have to be a global monitoring agency that could monitor each source of CO₂  emissions and would be ready to punish those polluters who do so without a permit.  This is the part of “cap and trade” that faces the biggest difficulties.  Remember that real regulation is not done by Soloman-like regulators who are infinitely fair, but by actual people, like international soccer referees, so that various human biases rather than fairness would show through in international environmental regulation.  The problem of political bias and lack of information in regulation is seen in this warning from Pigou himself (Some Aspects of the Welfare State,” Diogenes 7:1-11 (1954), p. 10.):

It must be confessed, however, that we seldom know enough to decide in what fields and to what extent the State, on account of them could usefully interfere with individual freedom of choice. Moreover, even though economist were able to provide a perfect blueprint for beneficial State action, politicians are not philosopher kings and a blueprint might quickly yield place on their desks to the propaganda of competing pressure groups. “Fancy” finance, like a fancy franchise, whatever its theoretical attractions, has, at all events in a democracy, dim practical prospects.

“Cap and Trade,” itself is a good idea.  It is a market-based approach to efficiently reduce the amount of emission of CO₂.  The real difficulties are first, setting the right amount of emissions to allow and second, monitoring and regulating by a global authority, giving up sovereignty to regulators who are likely to want to tilt the playing field away from favoring Americans.  Before going down the road of regulating CO₂ through any approach, we should be very sure of what human reductions in CO₂ will actually accomplish and whether there are alternatives that might work better, such as re-forestation of large areas of the planet.

-MC

I am doing a little research project estimating the elasticity of demand for cigarettes. This is to help lawmakers see the effects of increasing the state tax rate on cigarettes.  In doing this, I have estimated the effects of state cigarette tax rates on state cigarette prices.  After controlling for several other factors, I have estimated that, holding these other factors constant (controlling for their variation), that for every 1-cent increase in state cigarette tax rates, the price in the state goes up by more than 1 cent, by about 1.12 cents.  The correlation is extremely strong, and I am confident the rate of increase in prices is no smaller than 1.09 for every 1 cent increase in state tax rates. 

I am sure that this is correct in terms of both my statistical estimation AND economic theory, though it does not exactly mesh with the somewhat simpler theory we saw in chapter 8.  So my first question is why is this counter to the theory in the first part of chapter 8?  For the first correct answer to this question posted here on the blog, I will give double the points I usually give. 

Now for the second question: “What is the reason for this suprising result?”  Hint: the answer has to do with what has been termed the “3rd law of demand.” For the first correct answer to this question, I will give FOUR times the usual blog comment points. Be the first on your block to win!

-MC