Final Exam Study Guide for Economics 322
Chapters 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, & 14 and bits from
chs. 17 & 21
Terms
1. marginal user
cost
2. efficient
allocation
3. efficient
intertemporal allocation
4. intertemporal
fairness or intergenerational fairness
5. Rawls A Theory
of Justice
6. Difference
Principle (what’s best for the least well off)
7. Decisions made
“behind a veil of ignornace”
8. Hartwick’s rule
9. Weak
Sustainability
10. Strong Sustainability
11. Environmental Sustainability
12. population growth rate = birthrate-death
rate + immigration rate - emigration rate
13. fertility rate replacement rate (with
populations)
14. stationary population
15. output per capita
16. age structure effect, youth effect,
retirement effect, female availability effect
17. theory of demographic transition
18. supply and demand for children (and
factors affecting each)
19. marketable birth rights
20. current reserves, potential reserves, and
resource endowment
21. depletable resource
22. recyclable resource
23. renewable resource
24. efficient allocations (extraction rate)
of depletable resources
25. marginal user costs and marginal
extraction costs
26. efficient wildlife harvests
27. sustainable yield, maximum sustainable
yield, minimum viable population
28. natural equilibrium
29. carrying capacity
30. static efficient sustained yield, dynamic
efficient sustained yield
31. contemporaneous externality
32. intergenerational externality
33. individual transferable quotas
34. transfer costs and real-resource costs
35. by-catch
36. absorptive capacity
37. stock pollutants
38. fund pollutants
39. zone of influence
40. local, regional and global pollutants
41. surface pollutants
42. command-and-control policies
43. emission charge policies
44. transferable emission permits policies
45. marginal cost rule for cost effective
regulation of pollution (p. 251)
46. criteria pollutants
47. ambient air quality standards, primary
and secondary
48. State implementation plans (SIPs)
49. Nonattainment regions
50. LAER, BACT, PSD, NSPS
51. Class I, II and III regions
52. Noncompliance penalties
53. Emissions Reduction Credits (ERC), offset
policy, bubble policy, netting, and banking
54. hazardous pollutants
55. BAT
56. progressive, proportional and regressive
taxes (or regulations)
57. incidence of regulation
Study Questions
- What are the externalities
with increasing the population?
- What is the basic relationship
between the population of a species and the growth rate of that
population? How does this affect the benefits of fishing effort?
- Why does fishing effort
extend to the level where there are no net benefits of fishing (P=AC,
profits = 0)? Why would a monopolist only extend fishing effort until the
dynamic efficient yield? What are the two externality problems associated
with fishing?
- Why is the maximum sustained
yield inefficient? Why is barring more efficient fishing methods
inefficient?
- Is a total ban on whaling
efficient?
- What role does speculation
play in the allocation of depletable resources over time?
- What is the effect of sizable
externalities (pollution) from either the consumption or
extraction/production of a depletable resource on the divergence of the
market allocation of the resource over time and the efficient allocation
over time?
- The dynamically efficient
yield of fish can be achieved by raising the costs of fishing, either by
outlawing efficient technologies or by imposing taxes. Why is the
technology regulation approach not efficient in any case? Why does the tax
method give us social efficiency even though fishermen get no gains from
trade?
- How do
individual-transferable quotas work? Do they deal with the
intergenerational externality? How?
- How does a fishing monopoly
right deal with both the contemporaneous and intergenerational
externalities with fishing? What about the by-catch and high-grading
problems?
- Describe and explain the
market allocation of pollution.
- Describe and explain the
efficient allocation of pollution.
- Why do emission charge
policies and transferable emission policies lead to cost-effective
allocations of pollution reduction, while command-and-control policies are
not likely to lead to cost-effective allocations of pollution reduction?
What are five sources of deviation from cost effectiveness with our
command-and-control policies for air pollution reduction? Explain each of
these reasons.
- What are four reasons that
emission charges and transferable emission permits differ in their
efficiency? Show three of them graphically.
- How cost effective is our ERC
trading program? What are 2 areas of concern as to the efficiency of this
program? Explain each.
- How have tradable emission
allowances facilitated achieving the environmental goal at a lower cost?
- How can environmentalists buy
pollution? Why would they want to?
- Why must there be assurances
to all participants that the ERCs created under an arrangement of global
trading of greenhouse gas emission reduction must be permanent, surplus,
quantifiable and enforceable?
- With toxic pollutants, why
there is no externality problem with occupational or consumer hazards.
What problem does lack of information pose? What incentive is there for
those with the information (employer/producer) to share it?
- What is the role of
enforcement costs in comparing different forms of environmental control?
- How can the costs of
pollution control be passed forward to the consumer? What happens in a
competitive market? How does the elasticity of demand affect the extent to
which the costs are borne by workers? What scale effects must be taken
into account? What is the new-source bias?
- To what extent does the
incidence of pollution control costs fall on landowners in an area in the
long run?
- What is the incidence of
pollution control costs in a monopolistic market?
- How can less stringent policy
accomplish more? Explain this with the example of the Zero Discharge Goal
of our water pollution laws. See
pages 347-48.
For
a reasonably good review of basic ideas over the term, see the sections of
chapter 21, “Sustainability and Development,” pp. 435-442 & “Restructuring
Incentives,” pp. 450-56.
Also,
read the article at URL: http://www.observer.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,750783,00.html
& be ready to criticize the article.